

CHAPTER

3

UNIVERSAL EDUCATION IN KANT: ETHICAL AND POLITICAL GROUNDS

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

Immanuel Kant's theory of education is a reflection of his philosophical system. However, he did not develop a systematic pedagogy but showed a keen interest in the educational reform efforts of his time, the Age of Enlightenment, of which he was the most important representative. In Kant, education is primarily an activity that serves the aims of the Enlightenment. Accordingly, education is the process of transition from being dependent on the judgement of others ('immaturity') to independent thinking and judgement (Kant, 1983, IX, 53). According to Kant, education is the greatest and most difficult task that can be given to a human being. This is because, unlike other living beings, man, as a rational being, has to set goals for himself and improve the raw tendencies of his nature.

At first glance, it is difficult to establish a relationship between morality and education in Kant's philosophy. Moreover, although Kant's philosophy is a turning point in the field of morality, he has not been able to put forward a distinct theory in the field of education. In other

words, Kant is not a philosopher of education in the classical sense. However, Kant extended his critical philosophical system to education through ethics. The basis of his ethical endeavor is to show the possibility of the realization of the autonomous and free moral law in all disciplines of the practical field. From this point of view, it can be said that the aim of this chapter is to try to show the conditions of the possibility of a moral education in Kant.

Today, the disciplinary terms "*education*" and "*pedagogy*" are distinguished from each other. Education is generally understood as the process of socialization of the individual through family, society, and institutions. By pedagogy, on the other hand, we mean the practical science of education. However, Kant often uses these terms in the same sense. For example, in his work *On Pedagogy*, we come across the following statements: 'The art of education or pedagogy must be legal.' (Kant, 1983, X, 703) In another place, he says, "Pedagogy or the teaching of education is either physical or practical." (Kant, 1983, X, 712). It can be said that within Kant's practical philosophy, education is presented as a problem with both theoretical and practical dimensions. Education is a theoretical problem when the scientific character of pedagogy is to be shown; education is an experimental-practical problem when it comes to the moralization of man (not the grounding of morality). Analyzing all these approaches requires us to investigate Kant's understanding of anthropology, philosophy of history, pedagogy and, of course, ethics.

Kant's approach to the problem of education is essentially cosmopolitan and humanist in character. Such an understanding of education is based on a *universalist* ethical principle. In this framework, our presentation will first discuss education as a process of acquiring moral maxims. Secondly, the stages of education in Kant will be analyzed in the second part under the title of 'education of generations'. Here we will examine the three stages of education, namely the concepts of civilization, culturalization, and moralization, developed by Kant in his books on pedagogy, religion, and anthropology. In the third part, the concept of the university, the distinction between higher and lower faculties, and the function of the faculty of philosophy, which Kant

analyzes in his work *The Conflict of Faculties*, will be evaluated. In the last part, the possibility of a cosmopolitan and universal education, which Kant shapes on the basis of ethics, will be discussed.

3.2 EDUCATION AS A PROCESS OF INSTILLING MORAL MAXIMS

Kant's moral philosophy is not primarily based on the concept of duty, but on the idea of being as autonomous and free, and therefore as an end in itself. The spirit of Kant's practical philosophy is freedom, more precisely the freedom of the will. As a rational being, man's aim and duty is to realize 'a good will in itself' (Kant, 1983, VI, 21). In other words, it is the realization of reason itself. This is possible through the full unfolding of human faculties through rational activity. In Kant, the ultimate goal of human existence, as will be seen in more detail below, is realized in three stages: acculturation, civilization and moralization (Kant, 1983, X, 678). This task must be fulfilled in all fields of philosophy.

According to Kant, who follows the traditional approach, the human being is on the one hand a sensory/natural being and on the other hand a rational/free being. Based on this distinction, natural philosophy and moral philosophy allow human beings to position themselves as those who know and act. Man, necessarily acts in the realm of 'what is' on the one hand and 'what ought to be' on the other. The moral freedom of man in the practical field depends on the possibility of considering this freedom in the theoretical field. For this reason, transcendental freedom is the starting point for achieving practical freedom and establishing a free moral education. Accordingly, *transcendental freedom* is the ability of reason 'to be independent of all the determinants of the world of the senses' or 'to initiate a series of appearances' in terms of the causality of reason (Kant, 1983, IV, 676). In terms of transcendental freedom, practical freedom means that the will is independent of the compulsion of the motives of the sensuality.

The good will cannot have any determining cause other than the general law-making form. Only such a will can be autonomous and free. But since the human will be not competent, the moral good is presented to the will in the form of a command (Kant, 1983, VI, 41). Thus, the good takes on the character of a duty for man. In other words, the good will becomes the will that wills the duty. A morally right action in the full sense is an action done purely *out of duty*. Accordingly, '*duty is the necessity of action out of respect for the law*' (Kant, 1983, VI, 26). Practical reason is the faculty that makes the will completely free by virtue of its autonomy; for in order to be morally good, one must first be free from internal and external limitations (*negative freedom*), and then one must obey the law of one's own making (*positive freedom*) (Kant, 1983, VI, 144). The moral law (absolute commandment) functions as an ever-usable criterion, like a compass in our hands. The moral commandment, or absolute commandment, which serves to test each subjective principle (maxim) of action in the light of generalizability, is as follows:

Act only according to the maxim, which at the same time you would wish to be a general law (Kant, 1983, VI, 51).

Even the most ordinary person, without any training, can discern which forms of maxims make them suitable for being established as general laws and which do not (Kant, 1983, VI, 17). However, since ordinary human reason is always open to temptation, a complete justification of the moral principle at the level of practical reason is essential. On the other hand, man as legislator has to assume a *Kingdom of Purposes (the intellectual world)* (Kant, 1983, VI, 66), which will be realized through the freedom of his will. The idea of purposiveness in nature ultimately leads us to ask the question of what the end-purpose of nature is. According to Kant, since the final end of nature cannot be happiness, it can only be the end through which man uses nature as an instrument of culture. However, this is a goal that can be realized in the race, not in the individual. The fundamental goal that nature has set for the human race is the formation of a 'universal civilized society' (Kant,

1983, IX, 47). Through a complete and competent constitution to which all human beings are subject, the conflict between the individual and society, i.e. the 'unsocial sociality' (Kant, 1983, IX, 37), can be eliminated. The notion of purposiveness, in the historical social context, leads us to *the ideal of perpetual/eternal peace* in which the final end of nature or the *moralization of man* can be fully realized (Kant, 1983, IX, 218, 251).

Kant's *deontic* model of ethics not only offers a universalizable formal criterion for maxims but also sets a subjective goal by making the human being the object of respect as an end in itself. Likewise, by setting before man, as the only 'value-bearing' being, the goal of a 'universal civilized society' and 'eternal peace' in the ethical-political sphere, and the ultimate goal of becoming an honorable member of an 'ethical community regulated according to the laws of virtue' or the 'Kingdom of Purposes' in the ethical-theological sphere, he provides the motivation for the continuous development and education of his moral maxims.

3.3 EDUCATION AS A PROCESS OF IMPROVING THE NATURAL STRUCTURES (ABILITIES) OF HUMAN BEINGS

Morality is as inevitable for anthropology as it is for pedagogy. For Kant, ethics, anthropology and pedagogy both seek to answer the question of what man is. If we are talking about the education of virtue, we are recognizing that human beings cannot have this value by their own accord. All living beings (animals), with the exception of human beings, reach their own determinations only in an instinctive manner. However, human beings are not subject to such a natural process. Therefore, man needs a 'second nature'. The section on the Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Practical Reason opens the discussion under the title of character education, in which the objective moral law can be adapted to the subjective (Kant, 1983, VI, 287–299). In this context, the human sensory structure and its education play an important role. Therefore, in Kant's words, the natural structure becomes the main problem to be analyzed in terms of education. This is because the natural structure

provides us with an answer to the question of why human beings, who also have an animal structure, have to be educated.

In his essay *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, Kant mentions three 'basic structures (faculties)' that constitute 'the determining elements of man': '*the animal nature of man* as a living being'; '*the humanity of man* as a living and at the same time intelligent being"; and '*the personality of man* as a rational and at the same time responsible being' (Kant, 1983, VII, 672, 673). The first, i.e., the animal nature, involves the human drive for self-preservation, reproduction, and socialization. This structure essentially implies a physical and purely mechanical *self-love*; since it does not include reason, the concept of evil cannot find a place in these drives, but 'the seeds of evil can be sown in them' (Kant, 1983, VII, 673). In this sense, motives are the cause of simple conflict in society, and as such, they stand against the purposiveness of nature, which aims to develop all human characteristics in unity (Çilingir & Küçükali, 2004, 88, 89).

The second structure, i.e., the human structure, though generally physical/physiological, also manifests itself as the corresponding *self-love* (for which reason is necessary), i.e., 'a tendency *to create value in the thought of another*' (Kant, 1983, VII, 674). Although this is 'the essential structure for good', it can easily become the cause of evil in society. Thus, evil first appears when people come together, when they start to live together. Jealousy, competition, greed, ingratitude, and harming others are evils that arise from this structure, and Kant calls them the evils of culture. Again, these can be shown as 'appearances of evil' since evil is not yet determined in this structure. Because evil is always a moral thing.

The third structure, or *personality structure*, is the predisposition to respect the moral law '*as a self-sufficient motive of personal choice (Willkür)*' (Kant, 1983, VII, 674). In the first two structures, according to Kant, the human being manifests itself only as a 'human being', not as a 'person/person'. It is in the third structure that 'personality' first finds its place, which is why it is 'the core of goodness in man'. These natural structures are 'not only (negatively) *good* (i.e. not in contradiction with the moral law), but also *good-orientated* (i.e. they demand compliance with the

moral law)' (Kant, 1983, VII, 675). Therefore, says Kant, it is not only unnecessary but also harmful to want to destroy them in connection with tendencies. Natural structures are 'essential' if they belong to the possibility of such a being and 'accidental' if the being is spontaneously possible without them. With this distinction, Kant not only opens the door to freedom by seeing the problem as an accidental structure but also wants to solve the problem of evil in human nature. The tendencies in human nature, as a product of nature, are intrinsically good. They should be discarded only if they are against the moral law, that is, if they reverse the moral order of maxims.

Man's moral obligation requires the establishment and development of a pedagogical character. For this reason, teaching and practice, knowledge and action, and theory and praxis are closely linked. All of these serve the development and thus the perfection of human beings' natural faculties. Virtue is in question here for the incompetent being, and it is necessary to educate it in order for it to lead a virtuous life. 'Self-competence', which is also a duty, corresponds to the dual nature of human beings and hence to two different stages of education. In his *On Education*, Kant divides them into *physical culture* (corresponding to physical education, which includes care and supervision) and *practical culture* (corresponding to the culture of morality, which includes classical school education or mechanical education, education for practical life and education of the moral personality) (Kant, 1983, X, 729). This corresponds exactly to our *personality* structure. In this way the culture of morality is established as a pedagogical task. Both the physical and moral activity of the person is set as a duty for every human being. The main concern in moral education is the development of a moral way of thinking rather than the development of a good attitude. This is why the culture in question needs the strengthening of feelings such as conscientiousness and love in addition to moral feeling. These are not objective conditions for the acceptance of morality, but subjective conditions for the adoption of the concept of duty. *Conscience*, for Kant, is not a faculty acquired by force. We cannot have a duty to form a conscience for ourselves; however, every human being, as a moral being,

has a conscience in itself. Having a conscientious obligation means having the duty to recognize duties (Kant, 1983, X, 714). Therefore, one can only speak of an indirect duty in the form of developing conscience. This can only be done by sharpening attention to the voice of the inner judge and using all means to form his court.

In his work *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, published five years after the 1793 essay on Religion, Kant identifies three more structures in 'complex' association with natural structures: 1) 'technical structure (culture - skill)', 2) 'pragmatic structure (civilization - civilization through culture)' and 3) 'moral structure (moralization - the intelligible character of humanity)' (Kant, 1983, X, 673). In accordance with this determination, human beings have to be *disciplined*, *cultured*, *civilized*, and finally *moralized*.

3.4 EDUCATION OF GENERATIONS: DISCIPLINE, CIVILIZATION, CULTURALIZATION, AND MORALIZATION

Kant begins his investigation of education and training with an anthropological determination of human nature. Unlike animals, human beings are in need of education, and education is a duty of the human species. For this reason, it is obligatory: 'Man is the only creature that needs to be educated' (Kant, 1983, X, 697). Since man cannot realize his development on the basis of instinct as in animals, he is in need of education and to be educated: 'Man can only become human through education. He is nothing but what education makes him' (Kant, 1983, X, 699). This is only possible by the previous generation educating the next generation. Education is an art (Kant, 1983, X, 702) and an important part of it should be oriented towards the future: 'Children should be educated not for the present, but for the possible future better condition of the human species; this is the ideal of humanity.' (Kant, 1983, X, 704) Thus, Kant places contemporaneity and universality, which are indispensable elements of today's education, at the basis of his understanding of education. On the other hand, education becomes a

condition for the possibility of forming a moral character and thus for the development of the essential tendency towards goodness in human nature (Çilingir & Küçükali, 2004, 82). This also means overcoming the anthropologically determined dual nature of humans as being animal and rational beings.

Education and teaching (*Erziehung and Bildung*) are often used together, and both are associated with culture in Kant (Kant, 1983, X, 697). Education essentially aims to discipline and guide children. The basic stages of education include disciplining (*Disziplinierung*), culturalization (*Kultivierung*), civilization (*Zivilisierung*) and moralization (*Moralisierung*), as Kant later calls them (Kant, 1983, X, 706, 707).

Man comes into the world as a 'raw', 'immature' creature. He harbors both the structure for good and rationality and the structure for evil and animal tendencies. The art of education consists in promoting reason and suppressing savagery. Savagery refers to everything in which man harms himself. Education is essential to develop the seeds of goodness within each individual. Education means educating a human being not only for his survival and his present well-being and freedom in the world but also to further his development and to educate him to pass on his knowledge and experience for the public good. The aim is to achieve a better state of affairs. According to Kant, this can only be achieved through positive education and the maintenance and development of this education. Education is a process that is passed on from generation to generation and thus continues to develop. Therefore, it must be constantly re-established and redesigned. This is achieved through the transformation of education into an institutional structure (*Studium*). However, education should not be seen as a mechanical activity but as an art. Principles should be established in education and become the nature of humanity (Kant, 1983, X, 703). To achieve all this, not only discipline but also culturalization, civilization, and moralization are necessary.

By *discipline* Kant understands 'the taming of savagery' (Kant, 1983, X, 706). *Disciplining*, which constitutes the first stage of education, involves making a distinction between animals and humans, i.e.,

satisfying the non-animal needs of humans. This is a 'negative' education because it disciplines needs and sets limits for the child:

It is discipline that prevents man, with his animal impulses, from turning away from humanity, from turning away from the goal appointed and ordained for him. Discipline, for example, restrains his impulsive and savage rush into danger. Therefore, discipline (Zucht) has only a negative side, i.e., it restrains man from violent actions. The positive side of education is teaching (Unterweisung) (Kant, 1983, X, 698).

Discipline should protect people from harming themselves and guide them to rational behavior in later life. It must, therefore, be practiced from an early age. The biggest challenge here is to legitimize obedience with the idea of coercion and freedom. Despite discipline, the student must grow in freedom (Kant, 1983, X, 711). If man can only become human through education, then humanization begins with the limitation of certain natural possibilities, i.e., discipline. The passage of human beings through all these stages necessitates education as well as a formal structure, i.e., a school. Because only in an educational institution can people collectively become *cultured* (developing the possibilities of ability), *civilized* (learning the rules, customs and traditions within the social structure) and *moralized* (in the sense of general human virtues). According to Kant, the neglect of discipline is the greatest evil in education. If a person has become so accustomed to living his will and the idea of freedom that he acts impulsively and according to his whims, then education has failed and can no longer be changed.

Culturalization encompasses instructions and practices by which the child's skills are to be developed without having to pursue a direct goal. This stage includes basic cultural techniques such as writing and reading, as well as aesthetic and musical education. This type of education is 'positive' because the child's abilities are developed through guidance and instruction. In short, culturalization is about human beings developing their basic abilities, adapting to human society, and becoming popular and influential, in other words, acquiring social skills

(Kant, 1983, X, 706). The stage of civicization or *civilization* provides for the teaching of cultural techniques and behavioral patterns corresponding to the relevant historical period, such as etiquette, norms and values, certain rules of conduct, and patterns of politeness or patterns of shame and embarrassment.

In Kant, one of the ultimate aims of nature is the establishment of culture. For it is only on the basis of culture that civilization and moralization are possible. From the point of view of the historical development of reason, culture really involves only the individual, whereas civilization involves society. Moralization, by contrast, corresponds to the best possible situation in the world. Moral culture is therefore not based on discipline but on *maxims* (subjective principles of behavior) derived from reason. While discipline involves only a process of habituation, acting according to maxims involves a certain process. Of course, the aim is not merely to act according to any maxim but to act according to general and necessary moral maxims (based on reason). Thus, education basically appears as a process of forming character and moral maxims. In other words, education is the process of changing maxims, that is, replacing maxims that cannot be generalized with maxims (moral law) that are generally valid for everyone.

The stage of *moralization* really represents the most complex and complicated dimension of education, because it cannot be achieved through education, teaching, or commanding alone. According to Kant, it can only be overcome by ensuring that 'children learn to think'. Kant's basic question at this point is the following: Children can attain insight, that is, the independent use of their reason, through 'freedom' and 'coercion'. The key to the solution lies in the answer to the question 'How can I develop freedom under coercion?' (Kant, 1983, X, 711).

Freedom is linked to morality in the form of a law that exists beyond individual interests or needs ('causality with freedom'). Freedom is moral and pragmatic independence. In order to become a responsible adult rationally committed to an enlightened society, moral education is the 'highest' educational task, involving both older and younger generations. The problem of moral education thus evolves into the problem of the

organization of a humane education. This organization is possible through a 'republican constitution' in which private interests are subordinated to public interests and the implementation of a general good is guaranteed.

3.5 WORLD CITIZENSHIP AND ETHICAL INTERNATIONALISM

The concept of cosmopolitanism, one of the ancient concepts of natural law, functioned in ancient thought to legitimize social orders by resembling the order of the natural world, the cosmos. Diogenes of Sinope considered himself a cosmopolitan because for him the cosmos, the teleologically ordered totality of things, is both the archetype and the natural condition of all orders. The concept of the cosmopolitan, therefore, positions itself from the very beginning against positive state and legal orders, since it is incidental whether their arbitrary statutes are in conformity with the natural order. In the Christian Middle Ages this opposition manifested itself in the conflict between the divine natural order and secular claims to power. The political consequence of the natural law requirement that secular orders can only be legitimate if they at least do not contradict the divine order is global political unity, since the divine order can only be conceived as all-encompassing and free from contradictions. Dante, for example, explicitly speaks of 'the purpose of the universal community of the human race' (as cited in Städtler, 2019, 60).

Kant shows world civil law as the highest point in the legal system. The condition for the existence of private law is state law, because private law cannot be implemented without state power. The effectiveness and stability of constitutional law or national power also depend on security and peace in foreign relations. However, international law itself is also without security insofar as it is based on the principle of sovereign states. World civil law must therefore have a basis in natural law. The original community of all people on earth, as

theorized by Kant, is to establish a cosmopolitan right of hospitality, which in principle limits all national rights.

A closer look at the concept of cosmopolitanism shows that legal, moral, political, and social aspects are intertwined. From a legal point of view, it assumes as an ideal a world republic in which all nations would be united. Kant emphasizes that the global state of nations is indeed the only permanent solution to the problem of war, but it is not at all what the peoples of the world want according to their own ideas of international law (Kant, IX, 211). For states to insist on their individual sovereignty is nothing less than barbarism. The international legal order is not seen as a political structure in which people live as individuals with the rights of citizenship, but only as the realm in which the law of states is applied (Kleingeld, 1998, 336). Kant thus considers that the objective reality of the idea of a world republic as an ideal is invalid only because the representatives of the existing states have different ideas of international law. All that remains is the reduction of this idea to an alliance of peace (Städtler, 2019, 62).

From a social point of view, however, the concept of cosmopolitanism can serve economic purposes. Everyone should be able to trade with everyone else anywhere in the world. Ethically, the principle of equal freedom for all people, which is at the center of cosmopolitanism, derives from the imperative to respect all human beings as human beings without any distinction. If cosmopolitanism is to embrace all societies, then it must be founded solely on the moral quality of human reason, which is common to all and inherent in everyone.

Now, since civil law cannot overcome conflicts of interest by overcoming national state constraints, conflict becomes normalized over time ("unsocial sociality") (Kant, 1983, IX, 37). World civil law, the confederation of states, and even the world civil republic must therefore strive for a 'moral world', a 'Kingdom of Purposes'. Kant understands a kingdom as 'the systematic connection of different rational beings through common laws' (Kant, 1983, VI, 66). However, such a kingdom of purposes is not legally possible because the ground of obligation is not

accessible to law. Kant explains this in his essay on religion, referring to the ethical community (Kant, 1983, VII, 767). However, the natural state of man and the conflicts within civil society, jealousy, domineering, greed, and the associated hostile tendencies systematically jeopardize the success of the moral endeavors of individuals. This danger can only be overcome by a society whose aim is the realization of morality, and which is itself constituted by ethical laws. The more detailed description of such an ethical community is similar to that of the legal community, the state, as an association of people under law, with the difference that these are virtue laws that are not obligatory to be obeyed. An ethical community can only be founded on the freedom of all involved. In contrast to the political or legal community, the ethical community can only be conceived as a world community of all human beings; its fulfillment is therefore a duty of all humanity (Kant, 1983, VII, 752, 755).

The realization of this 'ethical internationalism', i.e., the subordination of all human beings to rational moral ideas, can neither be reliably achieved by a single individual nor by a particular collective structure. The only thing within man's power is to serve the establishment of the state of God on earth, i.e., the moral community of God. Nevertheless, the actual construction of this state and community is ultimately only possible through the contribution or influence of God himself. In this way, the statist religious structures and the visible church are also included in this moralization effort. The ultimate goal, however, is to replace traditional faith with pure moral (rational) faith (Kant, 1983, VII, 777, 786, 803). In other words, the condition for pure practical reason for belief in God and his possible future kingdom is the awareness of the responsibility of the moral law. The construction of global collective morality through education therefore inevitably presupposes the eventual dissolution of religious unions in the form of the Church into a free ethical community. Universal education for total enlightenment would be the motor force for such a development.

In short, it can be said that ethical government in Kant, unlike global (political-legal) citizenship, is essentially designed for the 'whole of

humanity', that is, for an ethically organized world society based on division of labor and cooperation. However, there is no path from cosmopolitanism, the political and legal organization of world citizenship, to ethical governance; on the contrary, global ethical governance must create a political constitution in accordance with its own ethical structure. In this respect, Kant's ethical internationalism can be said to be more systematic than the cosmopolitanism of world citizenship.

3.6 THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSITAS AND COSMOPOLITAN EDUCATION

At the beginning of the 1765/66 school year, Kant spoke to the students as follows:

I particularly recommend to you that a knowledge of the present state of the earth, or geography in the broadest sense, be treated as a pleasant and useful subject, which can guide and serve a practical reason. Such a practical reason always stimulates the pleasure of expanding the limited knowledge (Kant, 1983, II, 915).

Such an approach encompasses, in Ernst Cassirer's words, 'the general moral determination of man as well as the sum total of the "knowledge of the world and of man" that played a role in all the pedagogical programs of the Age of Enlightenment'. The epistemic basis of the concept of "*universitas*" is the categories of the faculty of understanding and the ideas of reason. While *understanding* is the ability to unify phenomena through rules (categories), *reason* is the ability to unify the concepts of the faculty of understanding under principles. In short, reason is the highest faculty of principles. (...) Kant calls the systematic unification of knowledge 'the architectonics of pure reason' (Kant, 1983, IV, 695). The system is the 'unity of multiplicity under one idea', i.e., *universitas*. *Universitas*, as totality or wholeness, is the basic function of reason, the nature of reason. In this way, the fundamental determinant of not only object and subject, science and morality, but

also of the unity of sciences, that is, of the university, which is the institution of public reason, is the idea of "*universitas*" (Gözkan, 2020).

For Kant, the university or academy is a collection of faculties, like the spiritual and intellectual integrity of a human being. In the universities of Prussia in the 18th century, where Kant lived, there were two types of faculties: 'higher faculties' that trained business people, doctors, and theologians and 'lower faculties' that trained scientists (Kant, 1983, IX, 280). The lower faculties are the faculties of 'philosophy', with the departments described by Kant (Kant, 1983, IX, 289 ff.). The higher faculties consist of the faculties of 'theology', 'law' and 'medicine'. These are 'in the following order among the incentive measures which the government may use to achieve its purpose (of influencing the people): first, *the eternal welfare* of each individual, then his *civil welfare* as a member of society, and finally his *physical welfare* (a long life and good health)' (Kant, 1983, IX, 283). In order to regulate the benefit and happiness of the people in line with their own wishes and to train experts and administrators in academic disciplines that will realize this regulation, governments have made the faculty of philosophy, which is determined by reason, lower, and the faculties of theology, law, and medicine, which will serve their ideology, higher. Because people value their interests and happiness more than truth. But the faculty of philosophy deals with all these demands only under the guidance of reason. Philosophy is based on the principle of freedom and makes it its task to search for the truth (Kant, 1983, IX, 292).

According to Kant, the lower-higher ranking is a contradiction, and it is necessary to reverse this ranking. For in a system of sciences to be governed by these higher faculties, the university can only achieve technical unity, which is a blind unity. Only if the faculty of philosophy becomes the top faculty can the rational unity of aims, or *universitas*, be achieved in the university. The university is an autonomous institution of public reason. Its first and fundamental task is the commitment to truth and truthfulness (Kant, 1983, IX, 279).

In fact, the prioritization of the faculty of philosophy is also imperative for the government because not fulfilling the requirements of

reason and science means not achieving the targeted results. In other words, turning the university into an ideological and technical tool that will consolidate the power of an economic or religious social class, rather than science and philosophy, will primarily harm the future of the state and make an institutional conflict inevitable (Kant, 1983, IX, 281).

The dignity of individuals, institutions, and nations depends on the autonomy and freedom of individuals, their critical attitude, and the rational unity of the innate purposes of reason. The university is the main area where public reason and freedom will be directly embodied and first realized. Moreover, we have the responsibility to use our reason freely in the public sphere. By the use of reason in the public sphere, Kant means that a person, for example, a scientist, presents his knowledge or thought in a way that is useful to those who follow and read him (Kant, 1983, IX, 55). Public reason, thus, not only ensures the transformation of a society into a public body of consciousness but also determines the nature of academic activity. The goal of his education, as already mentioned, is the 'mature man' oriented towards enlightenment and cosmopolitan ideals. In short, Kant's idea of cosmopolitan education advocates a comprehensive concept of education (not limited to families, schools and universities), the indispensability of education for the construction of a true moral character, and the republic (a republican constitution) as the appropriate structure for moral education. And of course, a cosmopolitan education must be based on the principles of universality and equality.

3.7 CONCLUSION

One of the most important pedagogical problems of the Age of Enlightenment was the ambivalence created by the fact that the ideal of educating the human race was still determined by theology on the one hand and by educational theory on the other. In order to overcome this problem, Kant, in his pedagogical evaluations, searched for a way to construct education as the rational choice of a cosmopolitan humanity in addition to the religious-historical moralization model. In other

words, in an analogue to the possibility and necessity of the idea of the perfect state, Kant designed an ideal of education in which the mere mechanism of education would be transformed into science. However, the success of a cosmopolitan, morally designed education will ultimately depend on the free choices and actions of each individual. For, according to Kant, moral progress cannot be expected from 'private education' and, at the same time, from a school education focused on the benefit and success of the state's own institutions. True education can be a universal cosmopolitan education based on the principle of freedom and moral autonomy. However, such an education has not been sufficiently achieved either in Kant's time or today. This is because the ideals of education based on the freedom and moral value of human beings are gradually overcome by political goals and reduced to the social and especially economic functions of education.

The need for a science of pedagogy based on the generally valid principles of rational human education remains urgent. Because education, which is not transformed into a science on the basis of moral ideals, cannot be expected to develop a democratic and free society. Educational principles must always determine new educational goals and techniques in the process of historical change. Only in this way can it be possible to develop an enlightened society that can be sustained for generations, as Kant envisages.

Finally, in order to build an ideal cosmopolitanism as Kant understands it, one must first recognize that the existing cosmopolitanism has been morally corrupted by modern society and global corporations. The concept of cosmopolitanism must be developed towards the idea of a free world society organized according to the laws of practical reason. This development requires a social and theoretical critique of existing political, social, and pedagogical patterns and their history. The standard for this critique, however, cannot be empirically generated but can only be grounded in the principle of the unity of practical reason. Even if education is incapable of establishing a political order such as world citizenship, it can develop human life in

the direction of such an order through the adoption of a moral and international ideal.

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